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and synthetic method as mediating between two entrenched extremes, occupying a
previously unexplored middle ground, his need to distinguish himself from Diocles,
with some interpretative license, becomes clear.
There are some similarities of approach and expression between Diocles and
Aristotle. Diocles seems to share the Peripatetic awareness of the limits of causal
explanation, and some Peripatetic phraseology too, though the resemblances are
insu¸cient to support any of the stronger claims of Aristotelian a¸liation that
have been made for him. The point is, once again, to emphasise the wider set of
associations and interactions in play here, which V.d.E. μnds, and explores, from a
more Aristotelian perspective in about half the articles in this collection. So such
Hippocratic treatises as On Regimen have much to offer an understanding of
Aristotle’s investigations of sleep and dreams, and many more medical authors
participate, together with philosophers, in debates about the nature, location,
and workings of the soul more broadly. The strength of the overlap between
medicine and philosophy further encourages V.d.E. to allow for a greater breadth
in Aristotelian authorship than is customary. He argues, for example, that the
text transmitted as Book 10 of Aristotle’s History of Animals, which treats
possible reasons for sterility and related matters, and which is usually labelled
spurious on account of its more practical, medical, orientation, is in fact by
Aristotle himself; indeed, is one of his ‘medical’ works, as alluded to in the indirect
tradition.
In each case, in each chapter and for each theme, V.d.E. applies the same
methods of meticulous but open-minded textual analysis, whether it be of the
fragments of Diocles of Carystus, the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease,
or Aristotle’s On Dreams, to name but a few of the works scrutinised in detail.
From close readings he constructs careful interpretations, well situated within their
wider discursive and intellectual context. This approach is individually and collec-
tively productive, providing both speciμc insights and a cumulative process of
understanding.
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La Sala sets himself a challenging task: to cast new light on the nature of ancient
Pyrrhonism, particularly on the scholarly crux of whether Pyrrhonian scepticism, as
depicted in Sextus Empiricus’ work, advertised a life without beliefs (radical
or ‘rustic’ Pyrrhonism) or allowed the Sceptic to retain every sort of ordinary
beliefs, targeting for suspension of judgement only philosophic–scientiμc tenets
(moderate or ‘urbane’ Pyrrhonism). L. approaches this issue by elucidating the
precise way and measure in which Sextan Pyrrhonists argued dialectically against
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the ‘Dogmatists’: they borrowed dogmatic terminology, principles, presup-
positions and logical standards and tools and used them against the Dogmatists
themselves, with no commitment in propria persona. L. investigates how well this
dialectical interpretation μts various speciμc anti-dogmatic inquiries in PH 2–3 and
M 1–11, rather than focussing on Sextus’ general sketch of the ‘Pyrrhonian way’ in
PH 1.
The μrst chapter is devoted to the discussion of the status quaestionis, which is
generally reliable. L.’s choice to organise his exposition around terminological and
thematic nuclei rather than by author is refreshing, but risks making the overall shape
and internal coherence of the seminal interpretations discussed (Frede’s, Burnyeat’s,
and Barnes’s, as collected in The Original Sceptics, Indiana: Hackett, 1997) less than
perspicuous for readers not already acquainted with them. I am not convinced by L.’s
uncritical juxtaposition of the different views of Frede 1979 and 1984, and one might
perhaps have expected more attention to other valuable and more recent literature on
the topic.
The second chapter examines the structure of Sextus’ work and illustrates in
convincing detail his general ‘rule’ of borrowing and using dogmatic concepts,
presuppositions and logical and expository procedures against the Dogmatists
themselves. (I should signal that L. incorrectly includes motion, place and time among
the ‘material principles’ studied by physics, p. 59.)
The third chapter analyses the way in which Sextus structures the content of his
speciμc inquiries in a similarly dialectical way. Since the Dogmatists maintain that we
can attain knowledge of something only if we possess a coherent concept of it, Sextus
starts by showing the intrinsic inadequacy of the concept (or concepts) of the object
of inquiry (when the Dogmatists and laymen use the same term with different
meanings, Sextus typically distinguishes them; when a stricter and more technical
meaning can be singled out, since according to the Dogmatists themselves this must
‘precede’ [logically] the less proper ones, the latter will be ‘cancelled’ by the sceptical
arguments together with the former, which becomes the speciμc target of Sextus’
inquiry). Only as a second step does Sextus show directly and ‘more aporetically’ that
the existence of the object of inquiry cannot be established anyway (taking as an
example Sextus’ discussion of the criterion in M 7, L. lucidly shows that these direct
arguments too make considerable use of dogmatic presuppositions, or derive from
rival dogmatic schools).
In the fourth chapter L. explains that Sextus’ practice of distinguishing senses of
terms and phrases (e.g. ‘criterion’, ‘sign’, ‘to comprehend’, ‘dogma’, ‘no more’) serves
another important function, a defensive one against the Dogmatists’ objections that
(1) the Pyrrhonist refutes himself (the peritropê charge), that (2) he cannot investigate
dogmatic concepts and doctrines since he admits to not having any ‘comprehension’
of them, and that (3) he cannot live without beliefs (the apraxia charge). L. shows that
the Sceptic defends himself by following an indirect route: he individuates and
indicates all those dogmatic characters that he carefully eschews. L.’s treatment of the
dogmatic objections in defence of the existence of criterion, sign and proof and of
Sextus’ dialectical counters is clear, but sometimes imprecise in the μner details. L.’s
proposal of how Sextus’ reply to the apraxia charge in PH 1 might be construed as yet
another dialectical move is questionable: that the Dogmatists can be forced to
concede the possibility of inquiring into concepts and doctrines to which one does not
subscribe (cf. PH 2.1–11) does not imply that they would (or should) also admit that
one could coherently live in accordance with such concepts and principles without
any personal commitment.
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The μnal chapter returns to the scholarly debate sketched in Chapter 1, to cash in
some dividends on the clariμcation of the dialectical character of Pyrrhonism. L.
argues that some form of ‘insulation’ can be attributed, contra Burnyeat, to Sextus’
brand of scepticism: the Pyrrhonist suspends judgement only on those matters
concerning which he perceives a disturbing anômalia, and not on everything
indiscriminately (pp. 174–5, drawing on Barnes’s proposal); more importantly,
however, even on those matters on which he suspends judgement the Pyrrhonist does
not abandon the ordinary beliefs he shares with laymen; what he does abandon is the
dogmatic pretension that his beliefs are (and can be) rationally justiμed (p. 178). L.’s
thought-provoking contention is that his purely dialectical and allegedly ‘moderate’
Frede-style Pyrrhonist is, in some sense, even more radical then the ‘rustic’ one: he is
not committed to any dogmatic presupposition and can take sides with the bios
unreservedly, whereas on the ‘rustic’ interpretation the Pyrrhonist who only
acquiesces in his non-epistemic appearances and avows them while suspending
judgement on any matter of fact remains committed, ultimately, to some dogmatic
presuppositions. For he must at least adopt (1) the framework of the opposition
between being (‘external’ reality) and appearances (‘internal’ mental affections not
open to inquiry) and (2) the idea that if we suspend judgement on all dogmatic
concepts, doctrines and criteria, then we must suspend judgement about everything,
an idea rooted in the dogmatic presupposition that the possibility of forming and
defending beliefs (even ordinary ones) ultimately depends upon, and is reducible to,
the acceptance and vindication of rationally justiμed concepts, doctrines and criteria.
L.’s argument has some merit; it might be replied, however, that some limited common
ground between the Sceptic and the Dogmatist (apart from that guaranteed by the
dialectical character of the Sceptic’s anti-dogmatic strategy) is only to be expected, if
the former must be able to communicate his own ‘position’. Consider also that the
Pyrrhonist, as Sextus explains, is a natural-born Dogmatist (or, at least, a
natural-born would-be Dogmatist), who converted to Pyrrhonism because of the
failure of dogmatism to deliver the therapy it had promised (PH 1.28–9): the
Pyrrhonian arguments were not conceived, initially, as purely dialectical weapons, and
this is bound to be somehow re·ected in the deep structure and method of mature
Pyrrhonism.
Frede-style interpretations of Sextus deserve careful attention and have gained
large scholarly currency. What L. regrettably does not attempt to do is to tackle at
least the most serious objections that such interpretations face, among which,
crucially, is the di¸culty of squaring them with the declared therapeutic vocation
of Sextus’ Pyrrhonism: L.’s conclusion on p. 181 would certainly need to be
nuanced, since as it stands it leaves the Pyrrhonist content hanging on to all sorts
of ordinary beliefs, which must include the intoxicating ones concerning values
which Pyrrhonism is supposed to purge. Does L. succeed in delivering fresh
compelling reasons for preferring the interpretation he adopts to the rival ones?
That the ancient Pyrrhonists argued dialectically against their dogmatic foes is far
from controversial, although L.’s emphasis on this character is certainly
commendable. Whether everything Sextus tells us about his Pyrrhonism (especially
in PH 1) is intended as a purely dialectical anti-dogmatic move is quite a different
story, L.’s reading of Sextus falls short of establishing this more ambitious
conclusion.
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